ALAC:Direct Representation

This is a working DRAFT and does not yet represent the consensus of ALAC.

To retain its Internet management role, ICANN must clearly demonstrate that its policies protect the interests of At-Large stakeholders. Strong, direct ICANN participation by a conspicuous number of active Internet users would ensure that ICANN managed resources are not captured by the specific interests of any country, company, or constituency. ICANN depends on a strong ALAC to provide this representation.

In its role as the voice of the individual Internet users, ALAC firmly believes that the current multi-stakeholder framework at ICANN should be further strengthened to allow more proactive involvement of end-users. Currently, the advisory role of ALAC does not give individual users direct decision-making power in the management of the Internet as operated by ICANN. ALAC should work towards obtaining more direct power in the decision-making process for individual Internet users. At-Large representation in the GNSO and on the board would strengthen the perceived impact of ALAC, and hence encourage broader participation in structure formation.

[edit] Purpose of this Document

This document is a draft of a recommendation that would give ALAC representation within the GNSO, voting power on GNSO Council and Task Forces, and the ability to directly elect Board seats.

[edit] Composition of the Working Group

The drafting of this recommendation is delegated to a working group composed of all ALAC members and ALAC constituents who want to be involved.

[edit] Targeted Completion

The targeted completion date for this proposal is ???? at which point the entire committee will take it up for discussion, ammendment, and potential approval.

In the meantime, ALAC will make the best of a bad situation (of limited representation and limited power) by (1) working on RALO formation as possible, (2) collecting public expressions of opinion on ICANN policy, and (3) indirectly representing public opinion via the expression of the views of individual committee members.

[edit] Discussion

Without a strong vehicle for communication of end-user interests to ICANN, the ALAC faces a chicken-and-egg problem to gaining their participation: End-users have no incentive to participate in a complex building of structures and bureaucracies if they do not see where those structures will have an impact on ICANN decisions. Currently, ALAC can send liaisons to the GNSO Council and to its Task Forces, but cannot vote in those policy-development processes. Likewise, ALAC can and does call for public comment on ICANN policies, gather those comments and additional research into end-user interests, and submit reports to the Board incorporating the public comment, but has no clear indication that those reports make a difference. As a result, several on the ALAC feel that their comments to the Board regarding the interests of individual Internet users are a one-way conversation. ALAC submits repeated comments while rarely getting the opportunity to engage in dialogue with the Board to understand whether the interests of individual users are being heard or whether the ALAC comments could be revised to address questions and criticisms from other sources.

Faced with little visible evidence of ALAC impact and constricted input channels, some members have found it challenging to recruit Internet users to participate in structure-formation. In North America, for example, although the region has many already-established public interest groups that address Internet-related issues for Internet users, almost none has felt that applying for recognition as an ALS is worth the effort. The recruitment pitch is not compelling to some: "Form a structure (or apply for recognition of an existing structure) in order jointly to form another structure, which will have the power to select two members to a committee whose chief power is to select members of a nominating committee that, finally, selects eight of 15 members of the ICANN Board." The layered indirection might not be fatal if some of the intermediate steps were also meaningful, but existing ICANN process does little to make that so.

Maybe the pitch as it is being done in NA is not compelling. An ALAC campaign in the Caribbean got 8 ALS applications from 4 countries after 2 direct appeals and 2 emails. More are on the way. In LA the pitch works as well. Europe, Asia and Africa seem to be getting responses. Is it that the "salespeople" for NA don't believe in the product and thus the sale does not go through?

This does not mean that I don't think that ALAC should push for more power - I do. But I do not think that the reason given above is true. I think that as the avenue for the participation of individual Internet users, ALAC should have more direct input into ICANN decisions. But I think that this, as written above, is putting the cart before the horse. We are agitating for more power so that we can get more members interested. BUT if we get members first, we can show that we are representative of a large and important community, and thus deserve more input. I think the latter process is more likely to be successful, and logically makes more sense. -- Jacqueline

I also wonder if ALAC should request both GNSO Council voting and Board voting. As far as I know, no other constituencies have this dual voting power. I mean either to be part of GNSO (then send 3 reps from GNSO to the Board) or make an independent SO (GNSO, ccSO, and NSO) such as ALSO to get direct voting on the Board. My personal preference is to have direct Board seat, not inside GNSO and strengthen ALAC/RALO on its own. If you become part of GNSO, then you have little influence against Business, IPC, ISP and other "suppliers" constituencies as Non-commercial group has been indicating

If we ask for a voting member on GNSO there is no reason why we should not ask for a voting member on ccNSO. After all, at-large interests are equally involved in both. I think we have been ignoring ccTLD matters fo long and letting these be handled by the governments and industry where in some cases neither fully represents the individual user interests. My preference is to have a strong and active non-voting representation in both GNSO and ccNSO.