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=====Priority Level 1=====
 
=====Priority Level 1=====
* Recs 3.1-3.6 from the ATRT3  
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* Recs 3.1-3.4 from the ATRT3:
 
** Suspend RDS reviews
 
** Suspend RDS reviews
 
** One clearly scoped CCT Review that starts two years after the next round of new gTLDs and lasts one year. A framework of data collection must precede the next round of gTLDs prior to review member selection
 
** One clearly scoped CCT Review that starts two years after the next round of new gTLDs and lasts one year. A framework of data collection must precede the next round of gTLDs prior to review member selection
 
** ATRT Reviews should continue but shall start no later than two years after the approval by the Board of the first recommendation of the Holistic Review; recommend whether the Board should terminate or amend other periodic reviews or create periodic reviews; all documentation required for the review shall be available at the first meeting of the review team when terms of reference shall be established.  
 
** ATRT Reviews should continue but shall start no later than two years after the approval by the Board of the first recommendation of the Holistic Review; recommend whether the Board should terminate or amend other periodic reviews or create periodic reviews; all documentation required for the review shall be available at the first meeting of the review team when terms of reference shall be established.  
** The holistic review should: start no later than a year after the board's approval of the ATRT3 recommendation and then every two-and-a-half years after and all other reviews should be suspended while a Holistic Review is active (a maximum of 18 months; review continuous improvement efforts of SO/AC/NC based on good practices, the effectiveness of collaboration mechanisms, accountability of ICANN Community to their members/constituencies (survey results), and SO/AC/NCs' purpose in the ICANN structure, possible changes in structures and operations to reflect the representation of community views
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* Recs 1, 8, 11, and 13.1,2,4 from the CCT:
* Recs 1, 8, 11, and 13.1,2,4 from the CCT
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** Formalize and promote ongoing data collection.
* Rec 11.2 from the RDS-Whois2
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** Conduct periodic surveys of registrants that gather both objective and subjective information to create more concrete, actionable information.
* Recs 10.1 and 21.1 from the SSR2
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** Conduct periodic end-user consumer surveys with more behavioral measures of consumer trust toward generating more concrete, actionable information.
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** Collect data on the impact of restrictions on who can buy domains within certain new gTLDs (registration restrictions) to help regularly determine and report:
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**# Whether consumers and registrants are aware that certain new gTLDs have registration restrictions;
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**# Compare consumer trust levels between new gTLDs with varying degrees of registration restrictions;
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**# Assess the costs and benefits of registration restrictions to the public (to include impacts on competition and consumer choice)
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* Recs 10.1 and 21.1 from the SSR2:
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** ICANN org should post a web page that:
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**# includes their working definitions of [[DNS Abuse]] for projects, documents, and contracts. The definition should explicitly note what types of security threats ICANN org currently considers within (and outside) its remit to address through contractual and compliance mechanisms
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**#Explains the difference between DNS Abuse and security threats and malicious conduct
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**#list all current abuse-related obligations in contracts with contracted parties, including any procedures and protocols for responding to abuse
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**# updates annually, date the latest version, and link to older versions with associated dates of publication
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** ICANN Org and [[PTI]] operations should accelerate the implementation of new Root Zone Management System (RZMS) security measures regarding the authentication and authorization of requested changes and offer TLD operators the opportunity to take advantage of those security measures, particularly MFA and encrypted email.
    
==References==
 
==References==
Bureaucrats, Check users, lookupuser, Administrators, translator
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