Difference between revisions of "Cross Community Working Group on Internet Governance"
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==CCWG-Accountability== | ==CCWG-Accountability== | ||
| − | The CCWG-Accountability was developed in response to a community that did not believe that ICANN’s Board’s proposal adequately met the needs of the global multistakeholder community. The accountability process that was originally designed by ICANN received unfavorable public comments, resulting a revised proposal. After the revised version, suggesting a two-tier working group | + | The CCWG-Accountability was developed in response to a community that did not believe that ICANN’s Board’s proposal adequately met the needs of the global multistakeholder community. The accountability process that was originally designed by ICANN received unfavorable public comments, resulting in a revised proposal. After the revised version, suggesting a two-tier working group once again received a negative response during the public comment period, ICANN stakeholders submitted a joint rejection letter to the ICANN Board demanding a community-driven approach. <ref>[http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06sep14/pdfggcThDbfOp.pdf Stakeholders Joint Letter]</ref> |
The joint letter combined with reiterated demands for accountability improvements at an ICANN Town Hall Session at the United Nations Ninth Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and favorable comments coming from the NTIA, led the board to concede at ICANN 51 in Los Angeles that accountability and the IANA Transition are ultimately intertwined. | The joint letter combined with reiterated demands for accountability improvements at an ICANN Town Hall Session at the United Nations Ninth Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and favorable comments coming from the NTIA, led the board to concede at ICANN 51 in Los Angeles that accountability and the IANA Transition are ultimately intertwined. | ||
| − | Based on strong community sentiment, the structure originally proposed by ICANN, the CCG/Coordination Group, was adapted into the CCWG-Accountability, which became the vehicle for creating proposed improvement to the mechanisms already in place. | + | Based on strong community sentiment, the structure originally proposed by ICANN, the CCG/Coordination Group, was adapted into the CCWG-Accountability, which became the vehicle for creating a proposed improvement to the mechanisms already in place. |
| − | In May 2015, the CCWG submitted their First Draft Proposal, which proposed SO/ACs as Members of ICANN, giving them the ability to exercise certain accountability powers. | + | In May 2015, the CCWG submitted their First Draft Proposal, which proposed SO/ACs as Members of ICANN, giving them the ability to exercise certain accountability powers. These comments on this initial proposal expressed concerns with the individual SO/AC roles and legal personality required under this model. |
<ref>[https://internetnz.nz/sites/default/files/2015-10-09-ICANN-accty-chrono.pdf Chronology of Recent ICANN Accountability milestones]</ref> | <ref>[https://internetnz.nz/sites/default/files/2015-10-09-ICANN-accty-chrono.pdf Chronology of Recent ICANN Accountability milestones]</ref> | ||
| − | In responding the raised concerns, the CCWG met in Paris for a Face-to-face meeting and united around the Sole Member Model, which presented SOs and ACs as a single member of ICANN. This model was then developed into the CCWG’s Second Draft Proposal, which introduced the Community Mechanism as a Sole Member (CMSM) model. | + | In responding to the raised concerns, the CCWG met in Paris for a Face-to-face meeting and united around the Sole Member Model, which presented SOs and ACs as a single member of ICANN. This model was then developed into the CCWG’s Second Draft Proposal, which introduced the Community Mechanism as a Sole Member (CMSM) model. |
| − | The second proposal was met with significant resistance by ICANN’s board, which provided an alternative proposal in the form of the Multistakeholder Enforcement Mechanism (MEM) model. This led the CCWG to call for a Face-to-Face meeting in Los Angeles. At this meeting the board drew a “red line,” communicating that it could not accept a model involving Membership. Accordingly, CCWG participants began exploring alternative options, including considering a “designator” model. However, the Board asserted that like the Membership model, a designator model was unacceptable. | + | The second proposal was met with significant resistance by ICANN’s board, which provided an alternative proposal in the form of the Multistakeholder Enforcement Mechanism (MEM) model. This led the CCWG to call for a Face-to-Face meeting in Los Angeles. At this meeting, the board drew a “red line,” communicating that it could not accept a model involving Membership. Accordingly, CCWG participants began exploring alternative options, including considering a “designator” model. However, the Board asserted that like the Membership model, a designator model was unacceptable. |
| − | After [[ICANN 55]], in Marrakech, ICANN transmitted the final IANA Stewardship Transition package to NTIA | + | After [[ICANN 55]], in Marrakech, ICANN transmitted the final IANA Stewardship Transition package to NTIA. |
==References== | ==References== | ||
Revision as of 18:25, 16 December 2021
Cross-Community Working Group on Internet Governance[1]
CCWG-Accountability
The CCWG-Accountability was developed in response to a community that did not believe that ICANN’s Board’s proposal adequately met the needs of the global multistakeholder community. The accountability process that was originally designed by ICANN received unfavorable public comments, resulting in a revised proposal. After the revised version, suggesting a two-tier working group once again received a negative response during the public comment period, ICANN stakeholders submitted a joint rejection letter to the ICANN Board demanding a community-driven approach. [2]
The joint letter combined with reiterated demands for accountability improvements at an ICANN Town Hall Session at the United Nations Ninth Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and favorable comments coming from the NTIA, led the board to concede at ICANN 51 in Los Angeles that accountability and the IANA Transition are ultimately intertwined. Based on strong community sentiment, the structure originally proposed by ICANN, the CCG/Coordination Group, was adapted into the CCWG-Accountability, which became the vehicle for creating a proposed improvement to the mechanisms already in place.
In May 2015, the CCWG submitted their First Draft Proposal, which proposed SO/ACs as Members of ICANN, giving them the ability to exercise certain accountability powers. These comments on this initial proposal expressed concerns with the individual SO/AC roles and legal personality required under this model. [3]
In responding to the raised concerns, the CCWG met in Paris for a Face-to-face meeting and united around the Sole Member Model, which presented SOs and ACs as a single member of ICANN. This model was then developed into the CCWG’s Second Draft Proposal, which introduced the Community Mechanism as a Sole Member (CMSM) model.
The second proposal was met with significant resistance by ICANN’s board, which provided an alternative proposal in the form of the Multistakeholder Enforcement Mechanism (MEM) model. This led the CCWG to call for a Face-to-Face meeting in Los Angeles. At this meeting, the board drew a “red line,” communicating that it could not accept a model involving Membership. Accordingly, CCWG participants began exploring alternative options, including considering a “designator” model. However, the Board asserted that like the Membership model, a designator model was unacceptable.
After ICANN 55, in Marrakech, ICANN transmitted the final IANA Stewardship Transition package to NTIA.
References
- ↑ Update from the CCWG-IG Retrieved 06 May 2014
- ↑ Stakeholders Joint Letter
- ↑ Chronology of Recent ICANN Accountability milestones